This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behavior in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioral rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioral interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behavior. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behavior that is close to equilibrium behavior at the aggregate level. The individual-level behavior predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behavior that are difficult to explain using standard models.
subset of the players randomize, while others choose a mixed strategy. In particular, there is a class of equilibria in which k players choose a = −1, k players choose a = +1, and the remaining player randomizes between both alternatives with any probability.
The minority game is closely related to two congestion games that have been studied experimentally, the market entry game and the route-choice game. In a market entry game, introduced by Selten and Güth (1982) , players must decide whether to enter a market with a fixed capacity c or to stay out. 2 Players who enter the market receive a payoff that decreases in the number of entrants. The payoff to players who stay out of the market is typically taken to be constant. Like the minority game, the game generally has a large number of Nash equilibria, both in pure and in mixed strategies. An important difference between the market entry game and the minority game is that in the latter game, the payoffs of both actions depend on the number of players choosing that action, while in the market entry game, players can choose an action (staying out) whose payoffs are independent of the number of players choosing that action.
Route-choice games are closer to the minority game in that the payoffs of all actions are subject to congestion. In a route-choice game, players choose between two or more roads, where the payoffs of choosing a road decrease in the number of other players who choose that road (see Selten et al., 2007, and references therein) . For the cost functions commonly studied in the literature, the equilibria of the game are such that players divide themselves over the roads so as to equalize travel times and thus payoffs. Consequently, the pure Nash equilibria of the game are payoff-symmetric and strict, in contrast with the minority game.
A priori it is not clear whether players can learn to play according to an equilibrium in these games, for a number of reasons. First, these games have a large number of equilibria, so that players face the difficulty of coordinating on the same equilibrium. As the equilibria in pure strategies cannot be Pareto-ranked or ordered in terms of risk-dominance, no particular pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can be singled out as being most salient (Schelling, 1960) , so that without pre-play communication, players may not have enough information to implement a pure Nash equilibrium (cf. Menezes and Pitchford, 2006) . Second, in congestion games, players may obtain asymmetric payoffs in equilibrium which may complicate attainment of equilibrium, as coordination cannot be achieved through tacit coordination based on historical precedent (cf. Meyer et al., 1992) . Third, the pure Nash equilibria of the game require players to sort themselves across alternatives. This violates the common belief that in symmetric games, all rational players will evaluate the situation identically, and hence, make the same choices in similar situations (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p. 73) . The question whether players can learn to play according to an equilibrium in such congestion games, despite the apparent difficulties, has motivated a large number of experimental studies. The next section surveys some remarkable experimental results on these games.
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A robust experimental finding in market entry games is that subjects quickly learn to coordinate their play in the sense that aggregate play is close to equilibrium (Ochs, 1990, p. 169) .
For instance, Erev and Rapoport (1998) find that the number of entrants in a market entry game rapidly converges to the equilibrium value. Similarly, in their experiments on route-choice games, Selten et al. (2007) observe that the mean number of drivers on the different roads is very close to the equilibrium number. Similar experimental results have been reported for the minority game (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Chmura and Pitz, 2006) . However, individual players generally do not play equilibrium strategies, even after a substantial learning period. 3 For instance, Erev and Rapoport (1998) observe large between-and within-subject variability which does not diminish with experience. In the context of route-choice games, Selten et al. (2007) reports that large fluctuations in individual behavior persist until the end of the experiment, as is the case in experiments on the minority game (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Chmura and Pitz, 2006) . In all cases, the hypothesis that fluctuations can be explained by a symmetric mixed Nash strategy equilibrium of the game can be rejected.
In many cases, it is not clear what type of behavioral rules subjects employ when they choose an action based on previous experience. For example, Selten et al. (2007) are unable to classify 42% of the subjects in terms of the behavioral rules they use in their route-choice experiments, while Zwick and Rapoport (2002) cannot classify the behavior of some 60% of their subjects in their experiments on the market entry game. This suggests that a significant fraction of subjects do not use rules that are readily explicable in terms of optimizing behavior or based on intuitive rules of thumb.
While the individual rules may not be easy to classify, the interplay between the different rules leads to behavior that is close to equilibrium. Some authors conjecture that subjects develop counteracting behavioral rules (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Chmura and Pitz, 2006; Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport et al., 2000; Selten et al., 2007; Zwick and Rapoport, 2002) . For example, in the experiments of Selten et al. (2007) , subjects have to choose between two roads, with the payoffs of a given road decreasing in the number of players choosing that road. Selten et al. report that some subjects use a "direct" response mode, while other subjects use a "contrary" response mode. Subject who use the former response mode will switch roads if they experienced congestion in the last period, while subjects using the contrary response mode stick with their choice, as they expect other subjects to switch. More complicated rules are of course conceivable. At the aggregate level, play will be close to equilibrium as long as there is the right mix of behavioral rules, leading players to differentiate their choices. This does not mean that individual behavior conforms to a Nash equilibrium, however. In particular, there may be correlation in players' behavior across periods. Table 1 : An example of a subset of response modes for memory length m = 3 for some player i.
For instance, if the history of outcomes is (−1, −1, −1), then the behavioral rule s i,1 prescribes action a i = +1.
These experimental findings, and in particular the persistence of nonequilibrium choices at the individual level, cannot easily be explained by most learning models, which typically predict convergence to the pure Nash equilibria of such games or to Nash equilibria with at most one player who plays a mixed strategy. 4 The next section introduces the fixed-rule learning model, which departs from most other learning models by assuming that players have a fixed set of behavioral rules or response modes.
Learning with fixed rules

Model
At each period in time, an odd number of players play the minority game. After each round of play, they observe the aggregate play in that period. Each player is endowed with a fixed set of behavioral rules or response modes which they use to select an action for the next period. A response mode maps the recent history of play to an action for the next period. Which response mode a player uses depends on the performance of his response modes in past periods.
More formally, time is discrete and indexed by t. At each time t, the stage game is played.
After each round of play t of the stage game, the players learn which of the two actions was chosen by the minority of players. That is, if ≤ k players chose a = +1 in period t, with the other players choosing a = −1, then players receive the signal M (t) = +1. It is assumed that players have a limited memory: They only retain the sequence of the minority actions in the previous m rounds, where m ∈ N. That is, each player observes the same history at time t, given by h m (t) := (M (τ )) τ ∈{t−m,t−m+1,...,t−1} .
A behavioral rule or response mode s assigns to each history h m ∈ {−1, +1} m an action a ∈ {−1, +1}. That is, a response mode s prescribes which action s(h m (t)) ∈ {−1, +1} to take, for a given history of play h m (t) at time t. Note that response modes are stationary: s(h m (t)) does not depend on t, other than through h m (t). Because there are 2 m possible signals h m of length m, and two possible actions for each signal, there are 2 2 m response modes. These response modes need not have an intuitive interpretation; they are simply fixed rules that a player could use to select an action for the next period.
A key assumption in the model is that each player i is endowed with a random subset S i of the set of all response modes, which is fixed across periods. All players are endowed with the same number of response modes; denote this number by n S . For each player i, the response modes in S i are drawn uniformly at random from the set of all response modes for histories of length m, independently across players. An example for n S = 4 and m = 3 is given in Table 1 .
After observing the current history, a player has to choose one of his response modes to determine his action for the next period. Which rule he chooses depends on the performance of the different response modes, as summarized by their virtual score. The virtual score of each response mode is updated after each time period, regardless of whether the response mode has been used in that periodor not. When a response mode would have correctly predicted the minority action, its virtual score is increased with the payoffs it would have earned, otherwise it is decreased with the same amount. More specifically, the virtual score that player i assigns to response mode s i ∈ S i at time t is given by:
where m a (t) is the number of players choosing action a ∈ {−1, +1} in round t.
It is important to note that players do not take the effect of their action on the aggregate outcome into account. In determining the virtual score of a response mode, players only consider whether this response mode would have predicted the actual outcome correctly, not taking into account whether following this response mode would have affected the outcome. That is, suppose that at time t, player i chooses a i = −1, and that the total number of players choosing this action is m −1 (t) = k + 1, i.e., −1 is the majority action. Then, 2(k − (k + 1)) + 1 = −1 would be added to all response modes prescribing action a i = −1 , and −(2(k − (k + 1)) + 1) = +1 would be added to all response modes prescribing a i = +1. However, if player i would have chosen a i = +1, the number of players choosing a = +1 would have been k + 1, and +1 would have been the majority action.
The probability that a player chooses a response mode at a given time step is determined by its virtual score at that time, with the choice probabilities following the well-known logit choice rule. For i ∈ N , denote the response mode selected by player i at time t by s i (t). Then,
The parameter β can be interpreted as the sensitivity of choice to marginal information. In the limiting case β → ∞, players choose the response modes with the highest virtual score. Otherwise, every response mode is chosen with positive probability, with the probability increasing in the virtual score of the response mode. 5
Discussion
In this section, I discuss two assumptions of the fixed-rules learning models that are nonstandard: the assumption that players are endowed with a random subset of response modes and the assumption that players update the virtual scores of response modes without taking into account the effect of that response mode on the game's outcome.
Fixed rules
The learning model discussed in the previous section departs from much of the literature on learning in assuming that each player is endowed with a fixed set of rules that determine his action as a function of the recent history of play, choosing the behavioral rule with the best past performance to select their action for the next period. By contrast, most learning models either assume that players have a single behavioral rule (such as "play a (myopic) best response to the recent history of play," as in fictitious play), or choose among actions based on past performance (as in reinforcement learning).
The assumption that players have a fixed set of different behavioral rules from which they choose is motivated by the work of Arthur (1994) . In the game considered by Arthur, players need to decide whether to go to a bar or not. Going to the bar is only pleasant if it is not too crowded. Arthur suggests that players condition their decision to go on attendance levels in the previous weeks. For example, if the bar has been crowded for the last three weeks, they expect it to be crowded next week also. These mental models are mapped into actions: if a player expects the bar to be crowded, he will not go.
There is of course a large number of possible rules of this type, as illustrated by the long list of examples in Arthur (1994) . An important question, therefore, is which response modes need to be included in the model. This is a nontrivial issue. As noted by Erev and Roth (1998, p. 873) , while it is virtually impossible to include all possible behavioral rules, selecting specific rules bears the risk of "parameter fitting in a model with an enormous number of parameters."
The fixed-rules learning model therefore takes an agnostic approach, endowing players with a random subset of behavioral rules, so that no response mode is ruled out a priori. Players then choose the behavioral rule that performs best, given the behavioral rules of others. This allows behavioral rules, as well as actions, to coevolve. In a game such as the minority game, this may be a reasonable assumption. Whether a response mode is successful depends only on the response modes used by others. Conversely, any response mode, whether it has a sensible interpretation or not, will work if opponents use response modes that give rise to anti-correlated play. An agnostic approach as to which response modes players use may therefore be an elegant solution to the dilemma described by Erev and Rapoport, at least for this class of games.
This approach does raise a number of questions. First, one may ask why different players are endowed with a different set of response modes. A possible justification for such an assumption is that each player has different experiences prior to playing the game, and therefore has a different view as to which response modes are successful (cf. Aumann, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) .
Second, and perhaps more importantly, one could ask why players only use a fixed number of response modes. It seems that individual players have an incentive to increase the number of response modes they use, to obtain an advantage over other players. 6 Even if it is reasonable to assume that players only use a fixed subset of simple "rules of thumb" (cf. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993) , rather than considering all 2 2 m response modes, it seems likely that over the longer run, players will adapt the set of rules they use. It is not clear what effect this would have on the evolution of play.
The law of simulated effect and simple decision rules
The fixed-rules learning model assumes that players also update the virtual score of strategies that are not used in that period. The assumption that players also consider the payoffs to strategies or response modes not played seems to be a reasonable one. Camerer and Ho (1999) argue on the basis of theoretical arguments as well as experimental evidence that players obey not only the "law of actual effect," but also the "law of simulated effect," meaning that in reinforcement, not only payoffs from strategies that are actually used count, but also foregone payoffs from strategies not played. 7
Learning models that are based on the law of simulated effect have sometimes been criticized as being too demanding in terms of players' rationality. Not only do players need to to know the payoff structure of the game and the actions of other players, they also have to calculate their payoffs for the hypothetical case in which they chose a different action. Even if players only need to know the aggregate action, as in the minority game, this may require too much rationality on the part of the players. One way to reconcile players' bounded rationality with the law of simulated effect is to assume that players do not take the effect of their own action on the global outcome into account. In that way, players can account for foregone payoffs of actions or response modes not used, without having to do complicated calculations. That is, players use simple decision rules, as opposed to clever decision rules, in the terminology of Sandholm (1998) . This is indeed the route taken in the fixed-rules learning model, but as we will see, this assumption is not innocuous in the minority game. 
Theoretical predictions and experimental evidence
This section provides an overview of the main results on the evolution of play in the minority game, assuming that players' adaptive behavior is described by the fixed-rules learning model.
Some results in the literature are obtained analytically, others by simulations. In the simulations, a given number of agents is endowed with a random subset of response modes, and results are obtained by averaging over different assignments of response modes. In the first two sections, I
characterize the behavior of the model in terms of social efficiency and informational efficiency, and show that the two are intimately related in the current learning model. In Section 5.3, I
discuss how the predictions of the model can be understood in terms of the formation of groups that use counteracting response modes.
Aggregate play and volatility
An important question is whether the fixed-rules model can reproduce the experimental finding that aggregate play is close to equilibrium. In any equilibrium of the minority game, each alternative will be chosen (on average) by approximately half of the players-if not, a player in the majority could gain by switching to the minority action. Simulations of the fixed-rule learning model indeed show that the aggregate action A(t) := i∈N a i (t) as a function of time keeps fluctuating around 0 (corresponding to the state where each action is chosen by half of the players),
as can be seen in Figure 5 .1. As the game is symmetric, the time average of A(t) will be 0 in the long run (e.g., Challet and Zhang, 1997). As can be seen in Figure 5 .1, the variance or volatility of the aggregate action depends on players' memory length m. The volatility is an important variable in the present setting, as it is negatively related to players' success at coordinating their actions (as measured by total payoffs). Intuitively, large fluctuations imply that the size of the minority is only small, so that high volatility is associated with low total payoffs. It turns out that the volatility is in fact a nonmonotonic function of the memory length. Figure 5 .2 shows the time-averaged volatility, denoted by σ 2 , scaled by the number of players |N | = 2k + 1, as a function of α := 2 m /|N |, for a fixed number of response modes n S = 2. Section 5.3 discusses why it is natural to view the volatility as a function of α.
As can be seen from the figure, the behavior of the (time-averaged) volatility as a function of α is complex. In the limit of large α, the volatility converges to the volatility exhibited in the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. For smaller memory lengths (α small), total payoffs are much lower. In fact, the volatility is of order (2k + 1) 2 , so that the size of the group of players choosing the minority action is much smaller than k. However, for intermediate values of α, volatility is much lower than in the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. This suggests that players can somehow coordinate their play to reduce the volatility relative to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. Coordination is not complete, however; while players come close to the level of volatility under a pure Nash equilibrium at the value of α at which volatility is at its minimum, they never reach it. with a large number of players, the effect of one player's action will be limited, this is not the case for the minority game. Recall that response modes that are not used are rewarded if they prescribe the minority action for that period, even if playing that action would have tipped the minority to the other side. The response mode that was actually used of course does not have that advantage. This makes that players keep switching between response modes: over time, a response mode that is not played for some time will gather sufficiently many virtual points so as to be selected to be played, thus losing its advantage, until another response mode takes over again. Indeed, if players correct for this bias by allocating a small additional reward to the response mode that they currently use, players use the same response mode in every period (in the limit β → ∞), and play converges to one of the pure Nash equilibria of the game, provided that the memory length m is sufficiently small (Marsili et al., 2000) .
Information and efficiency
As discussed in the previous section, players seem to be able to coordinate reasonably well for some parameter value. How does this coordination come about? The only way players can coordinate is through the history of play. The question is thus whether the past history of play contains information that can help players coordinate their action. The information content of the history of play, or the degree of predictability can be measured by (Challet and Marsili, 1999) :
where A(t + 1)|h m (t) = ν is the time average of the aggregate action conditional on a given history of play (for t large), and ν runs over the possible histories H m of length m. Loosely speaking, H measures the information in the time series of A(t). If A(t + 1) and h m (t) are independent, then H = 0. If H > 0, then the signal A(t) contains information.
The way players choose their response modes in the fixed-rules learning model leads them to minimize the degree of predictability (Marsili et al., 2000) . It is again the parameter α which determines how successful players are at doing that, as can be seen in Figure 5 .3. Interestingly, the system changes from an informationally efficient phase with low aggregate payoffs (H = 0, σ 2 large) to an information-rich phase with high aggregate payoffs (H > 0, σ 2 small) at a critical value α c of α, and α c is exactly the value where the volatility is at its minimum ( Figure 5 .2). 
Response modes and their antagonists
The previous section shows that the qualitative behavior of the learning model is primarily a function of α = 2 m /|N |, where m is players' memory length and |N | is the number of players (for a fixed number of response modes n S ). Why does this parameter drive the behavior of the model?
Intuitively, the minority rule forces players to differentiate their actions. As there are 2 2 m response modes for |N | players, one would expect that players succeed in differentiating if |N | is much smaller than 2 2 m , and be unsuccessful when |N | exceeds 2 2 m , which means that one would expect a qualitative change in behavior when |N | is of the order 2 2 m , rather than of order 2 m , as observed.
The reason why it is the ratio between 2 m and |N | that drives behavior rather than that between 2 2 m and |N | is that the important variable is not how many response modes players can use, but how many different response modes they have. Say that two response modes are sufficiently anti-correlated if they prescribe a different action after at least half of the histories of play (of length m). Challet and Zhang (1998) Whether the actions of players using a certain response mode s and its antagonists can cancel out depends on the dimension of the space of response modes is fixed by the parameter m.
When the number of players is large relative to the number of response modes that are available (α small), then players are forced to use response modes that are positively correlated, so that volatility will be large. For intermediate values of α, players use response modes that are either sufficiently anti-correlated, so that volatility is minimal. When m is very large relative to the number of players, the number of players using each response mode will only be small, so that players act more or less independently and the volatility will be close to that under the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium (Moro, 2003) . However, aggregate payoffs are still higher than under the benchmark of the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, as there always exist pairs of players that follow anti-correlated response modes (Challet and Zhang, 1998) .
Comparison with experimental results
Can we relate this to the experimental results in Section 3? As noted above, the aggregate behavior is close to Nash play, in the sense that on average, the fraction of players choosing each alternative is close to 1/2. The idea that players achieve this by using counteracting response modes seems intuitive. Indeed, Selten et al. (2007) find that players sort in groups in the routechoice game, with one group of subjects switching roads if the road they chose in the previous period was congested ("direct response mode"), another group of subjects sticking to their choice of road if it was congested ("contrary response mode"), and subjects whose behavior is harder to classify. The number of players using the direct response mode was not close to the number of players using the contrary response mode, however, and indeed, large fluctuations in play around Nash play persisted until the end of the experiment. Also, Bottazzi and Devetag (2007) find that there is considerable heterogeneity in players' behavior in their experiments on the minority game. They show that it is not the heterogeneity per se which determines the players' success in coordinating, rather, it is the interaction between these different behavioral rules that make that players can successfully coordinate their play.
While the fixed-rules learning model thus demonstrates how aggregate Nash play and individual nonequilibrium behavior can be reconciled in a natural way, there are two important caveats.
First, as noted earlier, there is a large fraction of subjects whose behavior cannot easily be classified in terms of response modes (Selten et al., 2007; Zwick and Rapoport, 2002) . This could mean that subjects use response modes that may not have an intuitive interpretation (and are thus not recognized by the experimenters) but that nevertheless perform well, but it could also mean that their behavior is driven by an entirely different mechanism. A systematic study of the different response modes used by experimental subjects seems needed. Indeed, Zwick and Rapoport (2002) conclude that there is a need "to re-orient research on interactive decision making to individual differences, identify patterns of behavior shared by subsets of players . . . , and then attempt to account for aggregate behavior in terms of the behavior of the clusters of players that form these aggregates."
Second, a key prediction of the fixed-rules model is that players continue to switch between response modes (see the discussion in Section 5.1). This has not been tested experimentally; the few experiments that have tried to classify subjects' response modes only look whether subjects use a stationary response mode. Testing whether and how subjects switch between response modes seems challenging, as changes in actions and in response modes cannot easily be separated.
Concluding remarks
While adaptive behavior in congestion games is well understood theoretically, a number of experimental findings seem hard to explain using standard learning models. This paper surveys an alternative learning model, whose distinguishing feature is that players are endowed with a random set of behavioral rules or response modes. It is shown how models of this type can aid in reconciling seemingly conflicting experimental results in congestion games. In particular, it offers an intuitive explanation of how aggregate play can be close to Nash equilibrium behavior in congestion games, while individual play does not conform to any equilibrium. In the model, players naturally sort into groups that use counteracting response modes, which means that aggregate play will be close to the equilibrium prediction, while individual behavior can be very far from equilibrium.
There Chmura and Pitz (2004) , and Renault et al. (2005) . Blonski (1999) and Kojima and Takahashi (2007) study learning in games very similar to the minority game. 2 See Ochs (1999) for a survey of the experimental literature on the market entry game. Kahneman (1988) proposed a similar game. 3 An exception is Duffy and Hopkins (2005) who find that subjects coordinate on one of the pure Nash equilibria of the market entry game after a large number of rounds when they are given feedback on others' choices. 4 See Duffy and Hopkins (2005) and Kets and Voorneveld (2007) for a discussion of the predictions of different learning models for market entry games and minority games, respectively. 5 The model is thus very similar to that analyzed by Cominetti et al. (2010) . The main difference is that in that model, each player tracks the past performance of every strategy, which is mapped into a vector that specifies the probability with which the player chooses each strategy in the next period. Here, players choose response modes based on their past performance, and the response mode in turn determines the choice of action. 6 Indeed, players in the minority game obtain higher payoffs when they use a larger set of response modes, ceteris paribus (Marsili et al., 2000) . 7 A similar idea underlies models of regret-based learning (Foster and Vohra, 1999; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000; Young, 2004) .
